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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
BYU does not dispute that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the June 13,
2002 judgment made against Tremco Consultants, Inc, (the "Tremco Judgment"), which
was certified final under UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(b). However, BYU strongly disputes that
the Court has appellate jurisdiction over the July 10, 2002 supplemental order (the
"Supplemental Order"). The Supplemental Order is not a final order for purposes of
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j) because Tremco Consultants, Inc.
("Tremco"), SoftSolutions, Inc. ("SoftSolutions") and Duncan, et al.1 (collectively
"Appellants"2) have each filed post-judgment motions pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 52, 59
and 60. "A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall
have no effect." UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). BYU raised this issue in connection with one of
the procedural motions previously filed with this Court, and raises the issue here in
accordance with this Court's May 22, 2003 Order.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the District Court error in making a money judgment against Tremco

based on Tremco's written agreement to be responsible for the debt owing to BYU?
II.

Did the District Court correctly hold under the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel, that the facts established and issues adjudicated during the prior
1

Duncan, et al. is comprised of Kenneth W. Duncan ("K. Duncan"), Alvin S. Tedjamulia
("A. Tedjamulia"), Lee A. Duncan ("L. Duncan") and their respective family companies,
KWD Associates, L.C. ("KWD"), AST Associates, L.C. ("AST") and Julee Associates,
L.C. ("Julee"). However, effective June 1, 2003, BYU reached a settlement agreement
with A. Tedjamulia and AST.

1

binding arbitration and litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions, which were confirmed
by the District Court and unanimously affirmed on appeal by this Court, are binding on
Tremco as the entity that controlled, paid for and participated in the prior litigation,
where Tremco assumed the liability to pay the obligation and where Tremco had the
identical management as SoftSolutions?
III.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by striking the Affidavit of

Kenneth W. Duncan where the affidavit violated the rules of evidence, the parol evidence
rule, and contradicted the established record in the prior proceeding?
IV.

Does this Court have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2), over the Supplemental Order when Appellants each filed
post-judgment motions pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 52, 59 and 60 seeking to alter, amend
and/or vacate the Supplemental Order and when the written order denying Appellants'
post-judgment motions has not yet been entered by the District Court?
V.

If this Court does have jurisdiction over the Supplemental Order, does the

Supplemental Order violate the Appellants' due process rights where Appellants had
notice of and were represented during the hearing on the Supplemental Order, and where
the Supplemental Order specifically provides that third-parties in possession of
SoftSolutions' assets that are subject to execution under the Supplemental Order could
request a hearing and raise any appropriate defense at that time?

2

BYU refers to Duncan, et al. as an Appellant because they joined in SoftSolutions' brief.
The District Court denied Duncan, et al.'s Motion to Intervene.
2

VI.

Did the District Court error by making a Supplemental Order based upon

several mutually exclusive legal and equitable grounds which permit BYU to enforce the
SoftSolutions Judgment against approximately $15 million in sale proceeds which the
owners of SoftSolutions received from the sale of assets of the unincorporated
association?
VII.

Did the District Court cure any alleged due process defects in the

Supplemental Order by conducting a new hearing on the Supplemental Order and
allowing Appellants to present any additional materials or evidence to the Court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Findings made in the prior arbitration affirmed on appeal. This Court's original
review of facts determined by the arbitrator in the prior litigation, which was affirmed by
this Court on appeal, was extremely narrow. SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ.,
2000 UT 46, fl2, 1 P.3d 1095. Once the final judgment in the prior litigation was
affirmed on appeal, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in those proceedings are
binding under the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.
Application of mixed questions of law and fact. Where there are mixed questions
of law and fact and this Court is reviewing the District Court's decision as to whether the
facts come within the reach of the applicable law, this Court "review[s] legal questions
for correctness, [but] ... may grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a
given fact situation." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 17, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 11
(quoting Jeff v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)); see also Jensen v. IHC
Hospitals; Inc., 2003 UT 51, f57, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 ('"If a case involves a mixed
3

question of fact and law, we afford some measure of discretion to the [trial] court's
application of law to facts.") (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 26, 63 P.3d 650).
Review of the Stricken Affidavit. The District Court's decision to strike the
affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See In the
Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to Use of All the Water, 1999 UT 39,
|25, 982 P.2d 65; Jensen, 2003 UT 51, *{51 ("When the issue involves whether to admit
or exclude evidence, the measure of discretion is broad [and] we will not reverse a trial
court's decision unless it 'was beyond the limits of reasonability.'" (quoting State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)).
Findings of Fact. This Court reviews the District Court's "findings of fact for
clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence,
or. ..otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." ProMax Dev.
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997).
Conclusions of law. The Court reviews the District Court's "legal conclusions for
correctness, granting [them] no particular deference." Id.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0") (appellate jurisdiction)
UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10a-204 (liability for knowingly acting for dissolved corporation)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1408 (shareholder liability for distributions)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-3 (definition of partnership)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-l-12(l)(b) (partners are jointly liable for partnership debt)
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) (orders not final until post-judgment motions are adjudicated)
UTAH R. Civ. P. 17(d) (an entity may be sued by its common name)
UTAH R. CIV. P.69 (execution and proceedings supplemental thereto)

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
In prior proceedings with SoftSolutions, an unincorporated entity, BYU litigated
to compel the payment of royalties due under BYU's D-Search (software) license
agreement. The arbitrator awarded BYU $1,672,467, plus interest and attorneys' fees.
After the District Court entered a judgment confirming the arbitration award (the
"SoftSolutions Judgment"), which this Court unanimously affirmed in SoftSolutions, Inc.
v. Brigham Young, supra, BYU attempted to collect the SoftSolutions Judgment.
Until very recently, BYU's collection efforts were largely unsuccessful because all
of SoftSolutions' assets were being held by third-parties, including to SoftSolutions'
owners and associated entities. Even though WordPerfect Corporation ("WordPerfect")
paid over $15,000,000 to SoftSolutions' owners to buy the stock in SoftSolutions
Technology Corporation ("SoftSolutions Technology"), whose only asset was software
based on BYU's D-Search technology, they paid nothing to BYU.
BYU brought this action because Tremco agreed in writing to be responsible to
pay BYU's claims for D-Search license royalties. In fulfillment of its assumplion and in
an attempt to protect its financial interest in the outcome of the litigation against BYU,
Tremco controlled, participated in and paid for the arbitration and litigation with BYU.
Accordingly, Tremco is bound by the findings and conclusions in the prior arbitration and
litigation and is obligated under its written agreement to pay the claims owing to BYU.
Tremco and others continued SoftSolutions' business (without the protection of
SoftSolutions' corporate veil) for years after SoftSolutions was dissolved. As such, the
5

owners were involved in an unincorporated association, and BYU is entitled to use the
jointly owned property of that association to satisfy the SoftSolutions Judgment.
In addition to the proceedings and judgment entered against Tremco, BYU also
sought and obtained a Supplemental Order from the District Court to assist BYU in
collecting the SoftSolutions Judgment from those who had received the business assets of
SoftSolutions. The Supplemental Order allows BYU to execute on SoftSolutions' assets
that are in the hands of third-parties, if those parties had notice of BYU's claims at the
time they received the property, including the nearly $15,000,000 in proceeds some of the
owners received from the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock in 1994.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
From September 26-29, 1995, BYU and SoftSolutions engaged in arbitration
before retired Judge John A. Rokich. During the four-days of arbitration, Judge Rokich
heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence and reviewed lengthy
memoranda submitted by counsel. (R2000. 52.) After the arbitration, Judge Rokich
issued his Memorandum Decision, and determined that BYU was owed $1,672,467 in
past-due royalty payments for D-Search. (R. 2000. 44.)
On July 26,1996, SoftSolutions filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the
Fourth District Court, seeking to have the arbitration award vacated or modified. (R2000.
31.) On February 12, 1998, Fourth District Court Judge Fred D. Howard, confirmed the
arbitration award and entered the SoftSolutions Judgment in the amount of $2,278,679.02
(including pre-judgment interest), plus post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees, in

6

favor of BYU. (R2000. 39.) This Court affirmed the SoftSolutions Judgment (with a
modification to BYU's attorneys' fees calculation) in SoftSolutions, Inc., 2000 UT 46.
BYU then commenced legal action in the Fourth District Court to compel Tremco
to pay the SoftSolutions Judgment in the case of Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco
Consultants, Inc., et al, Civil No. 000400088. (R2000. 1-96). On July 25, 2000, the
District Court found a commonality of issues existed and granted BYU's motion to
consolidate the two cases. (R. 669-72).
Thereafter, Tremco filed an Answer and Counterclaim, (R2000. 228-337), which
BYU promptly moved to dismiss (R. 488-668). Tremco responded with a motion for
summary judgment (R. 676-743), to wrhich BYU replied with its own motion for partial
summary judgment and declaratory relief (R. 846-81). After extensive briefing which
lasted over a year and a comprehensive hearing on April 10, 2002, the District Courtissued its ruling on May 13, 2002. The Ruling granted BYU's motion for partial
summary judgment and declaratory relief; denied Tremco's motion for summary
judgment; and granted BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's counterclaims. (R. 1034-52.)
Accordingly, on June 13, 2002, the District Court entered a money judgment against
Tremco to pay the indebtedness owing to BYU which it had agreed in writing to pay (the
"Tremco Judgment"). (R. 1053-57.) On July 3, 2002, Tremco filed its notice of appeal
of the Tremco Judgment. (R. 1056-60).
At the time that BYU filed its motion for partial summary judgment and
declaratory relief against Tremco, BYU also requested a supplemental order to assist
BYU in satisfying the SoftSolutions Judgment from the prior business assets of
7

SoftSolutions or from the proceeds obtained therefrom. (R. 848-49, 968, 1642-43.) On
July 10, 2002, the District Court entered the Supplemental Order. (R. 1138-51.)
After the Supplemental Order was entered, SoftSolutions, Tremco and Duncan, et
al. each filed post-judgment motions to vacate, alter and/or amend the Supplemental
Order pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 52, 59 and 60. (R. 1155-57, 1476-81, 1492-96.) The
District Court denied the post-judgment motions on July 22, 2003. (R. Supp. 86-87)3
Although proposed orders and objections thereto have been submitted, a formal written
order denying the post-judgment motions has not yet been entered by the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Where indicated, the facts were established in prior proceedings, as set forth in
Judge Rokich's Memorandum Decision (R2000. 41-52) and the District Court's Ruling
on BYU's Motion to Confirm Arbitration and SoftSolution's Motion to Vacate or Modify
Arbitration Award (R2000. 5-39) and are binding on Tremco, which paid for and
controlled those proceedings. (R. 1030-32.)
D-Search and the SoftSolutions Association
1.

In the early 1980s, BYU and its professors began developing an

algorhythm, which when properly applied, was capable of rapidly searching large textual
databases (the "D-Search" algorhythm). (R2000. 38-39.) It was soon apparent that DSearch's patented indexing and information retrieval capabilities had significant value

3

As directed in this Court's November 17, 2003 Order, BYU submitted an Addendum to
Appellee's Brief with this Brief which contains materials that should be part of the record.
BYU cites to these materials "according to their position in the addendum" as "R. Supp."
8

when properly used with commercial software applications. (R2000. 38-39.) Indeed,
SoftSolutions made millions of dollars from its use of D-Search. (R2000. 44.)
2.

In April 1987 and continuing through June 1990, BYU entered into a series

of license agreements with Tremco, Tremco d/b/a SoftSolutions, and SoftSolutions for
the use of D-Search in their products. (R2000. 39, 52; R. 1040-41.) The license
agreements culminated in and were superseded by the 1990 Exclusive License
Agreement, which constituted a single exclusive license and which treated Tremco and
SoftSolutions as a single licensee. (R2000. 12-13, 18; R. 560-574; 1040-1041.)
SoftSolutions and Tremco agreed to pay BYU royalties in exchange for the D-Search
license. (R2000. 38, 51; R. 1040-41.)
3.

Tremco, SoftSolutions and SoftSolutions Technology were involved

together in an unincorporated partnership or association (the "Association"). (R. 104445.) SoftSolutions was the parent company that incorporated SoftSolutions Technology
and originally owned all of SoftSolutions Technology's stock. (R. Supp. 63.)
SoftSolutions entered into and held all of the D-Search licenses which wrere used by
Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology. (R. 560-75.) The license to use D-Search was
SoftSolutions' only asset. (R. 1043; R. Supp. 62). Tremco and SoftSolutions
Technology used the D-Search license held by SoftSolutions, and handled operations and
marketing of the product containing D-Search. (R. Supp. 62).
4.

The unincorporated Association conducted business as SoftSolutions, Inc.

(R2000. 38), Tremco d/b/a SoftSolutions (R. 619), and as SoftSolutions, Inc. d/b/a
SoftSolutions Technology Corporation. (R2000. 19.).
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5.

Other participants inthe Association were Kenneth Duncan ("K. Duncan"),

Alvin Tedjamulia ("A. Tedjamulia") and Lee Duncan ("L. Duncan"), who controlled the
Association as the officers and directors of Tremco, SoftSolutions and SoftSolutions
Technology. (R2000. 22.)4 K. Duncan, Tedjamulia and L. Duncan also controlled the
Association through their respective family entities KWD, AST and Julee, which
maintained virtually exclusive ownership of the Association and its assets. (R. 1148-49.)
6.

On November 1, 1992, the State of Utah involuntarily dissolved

SoftSolutions as a corporation. (R. 507, 1045.) The corporate entity of SoftSolutions was
never reinstated. (R. 1148-49.)
7.

SoftSolutions' officers intentionally and knowingly allowed SoftSolutions

to be dissolved. (R. Supp. 60-61.)
8.

At the time of SoftSolutions5 dissolution, instead of returning the D-Search

license to BYU as required, SoftSolutions transferred D-Search to SoftSolutions
Technology and Tremco, who continued SoftSolutions' business without the protection
of a corporate veil. (R2000. 18-19; R. Supp. 62.) SoftSolutions did not receive value for
transferring D-Search to Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology. (R. Supp. 62.)
9.

Since November 1, 1992, SoftSolutions' business was continued by the

members of the Association. (R. 507, 1045, 1148-49; R2000. 338-34.) During that time,
the Association continued to use BYU's license and gained significant revenues from
sales of products containing that license (R2000. 44), and thereby incurred significant

4

SoftSolutions, Tremco, and SoftSolutions Technology shared identical officers.
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obligations to BYU for the royalties on the products marketed and sold by Tremco and
SoftSolutions Technology. (R. 1147; R2000. 338-48, SoftSolutions, Inc., 2000 UT 46.)
10.

Because the royalties owed to BYU had not been paid, the Association also

obtained legal counsel, negotiated, mediated, arbitrated and litigated with BYU after
SoftSolutions was dissolved. (R. 1044-46; R2000. 338-48, SoftSolutions v. BYU, 2000
UT 46, Ht 5-7.)
The Association Prepared SoftSolutions Technology to be sold to WordPerfect
11.

As the arbitration and litigation with BYU became imminent, SoftSolutions

Technology, which had continued SoftSolutions' business after SoftSolutions was
dissolved, approached WordPerfect in an attempt to sell SoftSolutions Technology to
WordPerfect. (R. 1264; R. Supp 64.)
12.

WordPerfect was interested in purchasing SoftSolutions Technology,

including its sole asset D-Search and ihe good will associated therewith. (R. 1043; Supp.
R. Supp. 64-67.) However, because BYU's significant claims for the D-Search royalties
remained unresolved, WordPerfect required certain arrangements to be made before the
sale could be finalized. (R. 1263.)
13.

First, Tremco was required to execute an agreement (the "Tremco

Agreement") whereby "Tremco consented] and acknowledge^] that Tremco is the
responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the defense
and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter." (R. 521-22, 1047.)
14.

Second, WordPerfect required the members of the Association, to

acknowledge in the Stock Purchase Agreement that Tremco was "the primary obligor" of
11

the royalties owing to BYU. (R. 1234, 1244-45). The Stock Purchase Agreement was
signed by K. Duncan, L. Duncan and Tedjamulia, individually and in their respective
representative capacities as officers of SoftSolutions Technology, and managers of KWD,
ASTandJulee. (R. 1244-45.)
15.

Third, WordPerfect required that the purchase price paid for SoftSolutions

Technology stock could be reduced based on BYU's claims regarding D-Search. (R.
1263.) Indeed, the Stock Purchase Agreement expressly states that "any liabilities or
losses suffered by [SoftSolutions Technology] after the Closing arising out of or related
to claims made by Brigham Young University in connection with its licenses entered into
prior to the Closing Date with [SoftSolutions Technology] or its former affiliates shall
be Setoff amounts." (R. 1263.) (emphasis added.)
16.

Thus, the parties that received proceeds from the sale of SoftSolutions

Technology stock to WordPerfect (i.e. KWD, AST and Julee) expressly contemplated
and agreed that those sale proceeds could be used to satisfy BYU's claims regarding DSearch. (R. 1244-45, 1263.)
17.

To comply with the provision allowing the proceeds of the stock sale to

WordPerfect to pay BYU, the Association set aside approximately $1,000,000 in account
no. 42016683 at First Interstate Bank to pay liabilities arising from the D-Search
litigation. (R. 401-05.) On February 8, 1996, however, A. Tedjamulia and L. Duncan
transferred the money and closed that account. BYU was not paid any of the money
specifically set aside to pay for the SoftSolutions Judgment.
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Tremco Paid For and Controlled the Arbitration and the Prior Litigation with BYU.
18.

After failed attempts to collect the royalties owed to BYU, the parties

appeared before an arbitrator. (R2000. 22.)
19.

In fulfillment of its responsibilities under the Tremco Agreement and the

Stock Purchase Agreement, Tremco hired Earl Jay Peck and the law firm of Neilson &
Senior to represent SoftSolutions against BYU. (R. 22, 1030-32, 1234.) BYU was
represented by its in-house counsel throughout the arbitration proceedings. (R. 22.)
20.

Tremco, through its officers and directors, participated in, controlled and

paid for the arbitration and litigation against BYU. (R. 1030-32.)
21.

In addition, Tremco caused its own arguments to be presented during the

litigation with BYU. Indeed, Tremco caused Nielson 8c Senior to argue among other
things that Tremco's license with BYU was separate from SoftSolutions' license and that
its saies should not be included in BYU's royalty award. (R2000. 32-33; R. 1030-32.)
Tremco also caused Nielsen & Senior to argue that royalties should not accrue on the sale
of "CLASS Conflicts of Interest product developed and sold by a separate licensee,
Tremco Consultants, Inc. pursuant to a separate license agreement." (R2000. 13.)
22.

Indeed, not only did Tremco have the opportunity to raise its arguments

during the litigation with BYU, it acknowledged in the Tremco Agreement that it "has
been involved in defending that action and has, itself, asserted various claims against
BYU as offsets or absolute defenses/' (R2000. 8, 32-33; R. 522.)
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23.

On July 3, 1996, after receiving extensive testimony and evidence, the

arbitrator awarded BYU $1,672,467 in past-due royalties incurred from 1990 to March of
1996, $115,000 in attorneys' fees, and interest thereon. (R2000. 11-22.)
24.

Thereafter, Tremco caused SoftSolutions to contest the arbitrator's award to

BYU by filing a lawsuit in 1996 in the Fourth District Court.5 (R2000. 46-56, 1030-32.)
Tremco elected to bring the lawsuit under the name of SoftSolutions, Inc., which is one
of the common names under which the Association was conducting SoftSolutions'
business. (R2000. 56, R. 1030-32.)
25.

On February 10, 1998, Judge Howard issued his Ruling on Defendant's

Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate or Modify
Arbitration Award which confirmed the arbitrator's Memorandum Decision in favor of
BYU. (R. 190-224.) On July 7, 1998 the SoftSolutions Judgment was entered in favor of
BYU. (R. 283-284.)
26.

On May 17, 2000, this Court affirmed the SoftSolutions Judgment and

affirmed that SoftSolutions had incurred obligations to pay royalties of $1,672,467 on
sales made up to March 1996—years after SoftSolutions' corporate entity had been
dissolved. (R. 1051, R2000. 338-48; see SoftSolutions, Inc. 2000 UT 4 6 1 5.
BYU Sued Tremco to Collect the SoftSolutions
27.

Judgment

After obtaining the SoftSolutions Judgment, BYU commenced a second

lawsuit against Tremco to compel Tremco to pay the SoftSolutions Judgment as it had

5

The suit was filed over 3/4 years after the dissolution of SoftSolutions (R. 507.)
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agreed in both the Tremco Agreement and the Stock Purchase Agreement. (R2000. 5-96;
R 522, 1234.) The Summons and Complaint in that action were served upon K. Duncan
as Tremco's registered agent on March 31, 2000. (R2000. 99.)
28.

Because Tremco controlled and paid for the litigation that gave rise to the

SoftSolutions Judgment, BYU moved the District Court to consolidate the action against
Tremco with the SoftSolutions' matter. (R2000. 102-104). BYU served a copy of its
Motion to Reassign and/or to Consolidate With Case No. 960400497 (the "Motion to
Consolidate") and supporting memorandum upon attorney Earl Jay Peck at the law firm
of Nielsen & Senior. (R. 102, 105.)
29.

After receiving BYU's Motion to Consolidate, Mr. Peck contacted BYU's

counsel and represented to BYU that because of an unspecified conflict or change of
events, Nielsen & Senior was not going to be involved any farther in the litigation against
BYU. (R. Supp. 58.) Mr, Peck further informed BYU's counsel that the law firm of
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Campbell (the "Berman Firm") would be handling the
dispute. (R. Supp. 58.) Mr. Peck also specifically instructed BYU that all future
pleadings and correspondence should be served on the Berman Firm and that no future
pleadings should be served on him at Nielsen & Senior. (R. Supp. 58.)
30.

Although BYU had originally served its Motion to Consolidate on Nielson

& Senior, the Berman Firm filed a memorandum in opposition to BYU's Motion to
Consolidate in accordance with the representations from Mr. Peck. (R2000. 183-192.)
Also in harmony with Mr. Peck's representation to BYU's counsel, no written response
of any kind was filed by Nielsen & Senior and the Berman Firm did not serve its
15

opposition memorandum on Nielson & Senior even though the Motion to Consolidate
was originally served only upon Mr. Peck. (R. Supp. 58; R2000. 183.)
31.

As a result of the representations made by Mr. Peck and the fact that the

Berman Firm did not serve its memorandum in opposition to BYU's Motion to
Consolidate on Nielsen & Senior, B YU caused its reply memorandum to be served upon
the Berman Firm. (R2000. 198.) Indeed, from that time forward no party served any
papers upon Nielson & Senior (although Tremco continued to provide Nielson & Senior
with copies of BYU's pleadings and Mr. Peck and Nielson & Senior remained involved
in reviewing pleadings and formulating litigation strategy). (R. Supp. 83-85.)
32.

In light of the foregoing, the District Court held that

it is distinctively clear that the agreement was reached between Berman's
office and [Nielson & Senior] that Berman's office would take over the
active participation in the activity of the case ... [Nielson & Senior] stepped
behind the curtain. Mr. Peck was no longer the front person, no longer the
lawyer that was participating and being seen with respect to court
appearances. But Mr. Berman's office was.
(R. Supp. 88.) The District Court's statement is consistent with Tremco5s
admission that it controlled and paid for SoftSolutions' defense of the D-Search
claims. (R. 521-22, 1047.)
33.

On or about May 31, 2000, after the foregoing pleadings had been filed, the

Berman Firm served a pleading entitled Supplemental Notice to BYU which indicated
that this Court had affirmed the SoftSolutions Judgment. (R2000. 350.)
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34.

On July 25, 2000, Fourth District Judge Gary D. Stott ordered that the

newly filed action against Tremco (i.e., case no. 000400088) be consolidated with the
original action, (i.e., case no. 96040097). (R2000. 383-86.)
35.

Tremco filed its Answer and Counterclaim asserting that BYU breached the

D-Search license agreements, which claims Tremco had already litigated during
SoftSolutions' arbitration and litigation. (R2000. 309-13.)
36.

In response, BYU filed its Motion to Dismiss Tremco's Counterclaim and

argued that in the prior litigation, which Tremco had controlled and participated in, the
arbitrator and the District Court had found that Tremco and SoftSolutions were a single
licensee (R. 12-13, R2000. 365 -66), that Tremco's claims were properly adjudicated by
the arbitrator and affirmed by the District Court and this Court (R. 12-13, R2000. 35960), and that BYU did not breach the D-Search license agreement. (R. 2, R2000. 358-59).
BYU also argued that Tremco's counterclaims were barred by the statute of limitations
(R2000. 357-58.)
37.

Tremco then filed a single memorandum in opposition to BYU's Motion to

Dismiss and in support of its own motion for summary judgment, (R. 673-743.)
38.

Tremco also filed the Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan and attempted to

introduce "facts" which contradicted the facts established during the prior arbitration and
subsequent litigation with BYU. (R. 744-831; R. 885-86.)
39.

BYU responded that the issues raised in Tremco's motion for summary

judgment had been previously litigated thereby precluding summary judgment for
Tremco. (R. 849, 885-86.) BYU also moved the District Court to strike the Affidavit of
17

Kenneth W. Duncan because, among other things, it contradicted the record already
established during the SoftSolutions litigation. (R. 882-88.)
40.

On October 13, 2000, BYU filed its Motion for Declaratory Relief and

Partial Summary Judgment requesting the following relief with regard to Tremco:
1.
An order of partial summary judgment.. .that Tremco was a privy to
the earlier litigation held before this Court, and that it is therefore bound by
the final judgment of this Court.
2.
An order of summary judgment.. .that BYU is a third-party creditor
beneficiary under the terms of the 1994 Agreement.
(R. 848.)
41.

BYU further requested that the District Court enter a supplemental order to

assist BYU in recovering SoftSolutions' assets from third parties in possession of
SoftSolutions' property. As set forth below, BYU alleged numerous grounds in support
ofits motion. (R. 848-49.)
42.

On September 7, 2001, BYU filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of it

Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment ("BYU's Reply Memo"),
wherein BYU reiterated its argument that:
BYU's judgment is indeed enforceable against [SoftSolutions], and
the proceeds therefrom including the money paid to Tremco and its
officers and directors, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia, for the
stock in [SoftSolutions Technology]. As such, BYU is entitled to an
order allowing BYU to execute upon all of the consideration paid by
WordPerfect to the officers of Tremco for their stock in
[SoftSolutions Technology].
(R. 968.)
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43.

BYU also undertook a "Factual Analysis" to assist the District Court to

determine there was no genuine issue as to any material fact because the factual record
from the previous litigation was binding on Tremco. (R. 976-84.)
44.

Shortly before the scheduled hearing on the parties' motions, Tremco

signed a written stipulation that its officers, K. Duncan, L. Duncan and Tedjamulia were
in direct control of the prior arbitration. (R. 1032.) Tremco also stipulated therein that it
paid the legal fees for the prior arbitration. (R. 1031.)
45.

Because BYU sought an order allowing it to enforce the SoftSolutions

Judgment against parties who had received proceeds from the stock sale to WordPerfect,
BYU subpoenaed copies of the checks paid for the purchase of the SoftSolutions
Technology stock from WordPerfect. Those checks were not produced by WordPerfect
until after the hearing on the parties' motions. (R. 1629.)
46.

On April 10, 2002, the parties appeared before the Honorable Fred D.

Howard for a hearing on the pending motions. (R. 1150-51.) In attendance were Steven
W. Call, Herschel J. Saperstein, Bruce L. Olson, Michael D. Mayfield, Samuel O. Gaufin
and Eric K. Schnibbe. (R. 1056.) SoftSolutions Association members K. Duncan,
L. Duncan and Tedjamulia were in the courtroom during the entire hearing. (R. 1056.)
47.

During the hearing, Judge Howard confirmed that the Supplemental Order

should provide that third parties holding SoftSolutions' property would have the right to a
hearing prior to any execution sale to protect their due process rights. (R. 1642-43,)
48.

On May 14, 2002, the District Court rendered its Ruling re: 1) Plaintiffs

Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment; 2) Defendant's Motion for
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Summary Judgment; 3) Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim; 4)
Plaintiffs Objection to and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan; and 5)
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. 1043-52.)
49.

The District Court granted BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's

counterclaims, ruling that Tremco was a privy to the prior litigation, that its claims were
or could have been brought in the previous case, that the issues were fully and fairly
litigated, and that a final judgment had been entered. (R. 1039-41.) Based thereon, the
District Court concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred
Tremco's counterclaims (R. 1039.) Alternatively, the District Court also concluded that
Tremco's counterclaims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.6 (R. 1039.)
50.

The District Court also granted BYU's motion for partial summary

judgment against Tremco, and held that Tremco's interests had "been legally represented
in the first action and that it was privy to the prior litigation. As such it is bound by the
final judgment." (R. 1048.) The Court also found that Tremco was part of the
Association and therefore BYU was entitled to enforce the SoftSolutions Judgment
against jointly owned property of the Association held by Tremco. (R. 1045-48.) The
District Court also ruled that BYU was a third-party beneficiary to the Tremco
Agreement and could enforce it against Tremco. (R. 1045-48.).

6

Tremco has not appealed the District Courf s determination that Tremco's
counterclaims were barred by the statute of limitations. As such, this Court cannot
reverse the District's decision granting BYU's Motion to Dismiss Tremco's
Counterclaims.
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51.

Regarding BYU's request for a Supplemental Order to aid BYU in

collecting the SoftSolutions Judgment, the District Court ruled that: (1) Tremco,
SoftSolutions and SoftSolutions Technology were involved in an unincorporated
association, and that BYU could recover property in which the participants of the
association have a joint interest, and (2) SoftSolutions fraudulently transferred its assets
to SoftSolutions Technology and SoftSolutions Technology sold those assets to
WordPerfect in exchange for valuable proceeds. (R. 1035, 1042, 1044.)
52.

On June 13, 2002, the District Court entered its money judgment against

Tremco (the "Tremco Judgment"). (R. 1053-57.) On July 3, 2002, Tremco filed a notice
of appeal of the Tremco Judgment. (R. 1099-1101.)
53.

In compliance with the District Court's Ruling BYU also prepared the

proposed Supplemental Order which allowed BYU the right to levy and execute on all of
the WordPerfect sale proceeds received by any party having knowledge of BYU's claims
prior to the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock to WordPerfect. On June 24, 2002,
BYU served a copy of the proposed Supplemental Order on the Berman Firm. (R. 1140.)
54.

After the foregoing hearing, Novell, Inc. (WordPerfect's successor)

produced to BYU copies of checks reflecting payments in the amount of $13,525,779 to
KWD, AST and Julee for SoftSolutions Technology stock. (R. 1629.)
55.

Because the District Court ruled that BYU could satisfy the SoftSolutions

Judgment from the proceeds of the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock to
WordPerfect, BYU submitted to the District Court the checks from WordPerfect as well
as records from the state of Utah identifying the parties who had received the checks. (R.
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1628-29.) The District Court approved BYU's written application to submit the check
information in the proposed order. (R. 1136-38). BYU labeled these documents as
Exhibits L and M. (R. 1065-1082.)
56.

BYU served a copy of its proposed Supplemental Order upon the Berman-

Firm, who represented SoftSolutions. (R. 1080). No objection to the form or content of
the proposed Supplemental Order was made by any party prior to July 5, 2002 (the time
period allowed by UTAH R. APP. P.§ 4-504 for objections.)
57.

The District Court entered the Supplemental Order on July 10, 2002 , which

was five days after the deadline for filing objections had passed. (R. 1141.)
58.

There is no dispute that Exhibits L and M are valid and that the payees

identified thereon received said monies. (R. 1065-82; R. Supp. 70-71.)
59.

The Supplemental Order is not based on the Tremco Judgment, and the

Supplemental Order unequivocally states on its face that it is made to assist BYU with a
collection of the SoftSolutions Judgment. (R. 1150.)
60.

To protect the rights of third-parties, the Supplemental Order also expressly

provides that "any writ of execution or writ of garnishment issued in connection with this
Court's [SoftSolutions'] Judgment and this Supplemental Order shall be accompanied by
a Request for Hearing which a person may file with the Court to obtain a hearing before
the Court in connection with such execution or garnishment." (R. 1141-42.)
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Appellants File The Post-Judgment Motions.
61.

Within days after entry of the Supplemental Order, Appellants each filed

post-judgment motions (collectively, the "Post-Judgment Motions") seeking to vacate,
alter and/or amend the Supplemental Order. (R. 1155-1157.)
62.

SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al.'s post-judgment motions were filed on

July 25, 2002, pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59(a), 59(e) and 60(b). (R. 1476-81; 1492-96.)
Tremco's post-judgment motion was filed on or about July 22, 2002, and does not
expressly identify the rule on which it is based. (R. 1155-57.)
63.

In their Joint Docketing Statement, SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al.

admitted that they "timely filed separate motions to vacate, alter and amend, and to set
aside the Supplemental Order under Rule 52(b), 59(b), 59(e) and 60(b) (Utah R Civ. P.)."
Joint Docketing Statement, p. 2 (September 18, 2002).
64.

In addition to the filing of the Post-Judgment Motions, several parties, who

are currently in possession of the traceable proceeds from SoftSolutions' property,
including Duncan, et al., requested hearings with the District Court in attempts to quash
writs of execution and/or garnishments issued on the SoftSolutions Judgment in
accordance with the Supplemental Order.
65.

Rannoch, L.L.C. and Carie, L.L.C. (both of which are controlled by K.

Duncan) have obtained hearings before the District Court regarding the Supplemental
Order. The hearings were granted pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 69 as contemplated by the
Supplemental Order, which expressly provides that third parties holding SoftSolutions5
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property would have the opportunity to be heard before that property could be used to
satisfy the SoftSolutions Judgment. (R. 1141-42.)
66.

On June 3, 2003, counsel for Tremco, SoftSolutions Duncan, et aL, and

BYU met at a supplemental hearing before the District Court. At that time, the District
Court scheduled a global hearing on all outstanding motions to allow all interested parties
an opportunity to be heard on any items they wished to address, including the Appellants'
motions to alter and amend the Supplemental Order. (R. Supp. 79.)
67.

On July 22, 2003, a hearing was held on the Post-Judgment Motions and

the objections and motions to quash various writs of execution and garnishment issued on
the SoftSolutions Judgment and the Supplemental Order. (R. Supp. 79.)
68.

During that hearing, the Court allowed Tremco, SoftSolutions and Duncan,

et al. to proceed as they desired and to make any arguments they wished regarding the
pending motions and the Supplemental Order. (R. Supp. 80.)
69.

During the July 22, 2003 hearing, counsel for Duncan, et al. acknowledged

that the Supplemental Order was not a final order that could be appealed because of the
various Post-Judgment Motions:
. . .This July 10 order is not yet a final order, it is not yet appealable
because of the post judgment motions which preclude its being determined
a final order until such time as these motions are either granted or denied.
And at that time, then if there needs to be an appeal then the appeal would
go forward as a final order.
(R. Supp. 81-82.)
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70.

At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Stott ruled from the bench and

denied the Post-Judgment Motions to alter, amend and vacate the Supplemental Order
filed by Tremco, SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al. (R. Supp. 87)
71.

Judge Stott specifically found that "there have been no due process

violations by Judge Howard as to the July 10th 2000 [Supplemental Order].'* (R. Supp.
86-87.) Judge Stott also that found that BYU wras entitled to execute on the proceeds of
the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock to WordPerfect. (R. Supp. 89.)
72.

Although an oral ruling was made from the bench, the District Court has

not yet entered its written order denying the Post-Judgment Motions and the motions to
quash the various writs of execution and garnishment filed by BYU.
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS 5 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tremco's statement of facts is based virtually entirely on the Affidavit of Kenneth
W. Duncan, which was stricken by the District Court. (R. 1036-1038.) As set forth in
Point VIII below, the District Court correctly found that K. Duncan's Affidavit was
inadmissible and insufficient evidence because it violated the parol evidence rule,
attempted to introduce conclusory statements, and was not based on his personal
knowledge. (R. 1036-1038.)
More importantly, the mere filling of an affidavit by K. Duncan, let alone one that
has been stricken, can not contradict established findings within rulings and final orders
from the previous litigation, which Tremco controlled, paid for and participated in. Thus,
this Court should not consider Tremco's inadmissible facts in determining whether the
Tremco Judgment was proper.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A money judgment was properly made by the Court against Tremco

because Tremco had agreed in writing to assume the indebtedness owing to BYU for the
D-Search royalties. BYU had a lawful right to enforce the assumption agreement
because BYU was a third-party beneficiary under Utah law.
2.

Tremco is bound by res judicata and collateral estoppel with respect to the

claims and issues asserted by BYU because Tremco completely controlled and paid for
the prior litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions because it had assumed the debt.
A. The existence of separate entities does not preclude application of the privy
doctrine under the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
B. The claims and issues for breach of the license agreement which Tremco
alleged against BYU are identical to those raised in the prior litigation.
C. The claims and issues asserted by Tremco were completely, fully and fairly
litigated in the prior litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions.
D. The prior suit between BYU and SofSolutions resulted in a final Judgment
which was made on the merits of the same claims and issues.
3.

This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the July 10, 2002

Supplemental Order. The Supplemental Order is not a final order for purposes of appeal
because Appellants filed post-judgment motions to alter and amend the Supplemental
Order under UTAH R. Civ. P. 52, 59 and 60 for which a final order has not been made.
4.

The Supplemental Order made by the Court correctly permits BYU to

enforce its Judgment against the $15 million in sale proceeds received from WordPerfect.
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A. SoftSolutions knowingly engaged in business for years after the corporation
had been dissolved. As a result, the unincorporated association is liable for the
debts and obligations incurred and the sale proceeds which it received may be sued
to pay creditors.
B. The claims and remedies asserted against SoftSolutions under its common
name are authorized by UTAH R. Civ. P. 17(d).
C. The owners of SoftSolutions, together with Tremco and SoftSolutions
Technology, became partners as a matter of law when they engaged in business
under the common name of SoftSolutions knowing that the corporation had been
dissolved in 1992.
5.

BYU is entitled to execute on the proceeds received fiom the sale of the

assets which belonged to the unincorporated association
6.

There has been no violation of due process and the District Court has been

careful to make sure that no due process rights have been deprived. The Court has held
multiple hearings and given every person an opportunity to be heard. It is not a violation
of due process for an unincorporated entity to be sued by its common name and for the
Court to enforce a judgment against its assets. Contrary to the arguments made, the
Court has not allowed for the execution on personal assets.
7.

The District Court properly struck K. Duncan's affidavit. It violates the

parol evidence rule, is contradicted by the record before the District Court, is not based
on Duncan's personal knowledge, lacks foundation and makes impermissible
conclusions.
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ARGUMENT
Sections I through IV contain BYU's arguments regarding the propriety of the
Tremco Judgment. Sections V and VI address the jurisdiction and due process of the
Supplemental Order. Section VII advocates the District Court's decision to strike the
Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan.
I.

TREMCO AGREED IN WRITING TO ASSUME THE INDEBTEDNESS
OWING TO BYU UNDER THE LICENSING AGREEMENTS.
The law is well settled in Utah that when a party agrees to be responsible for a

debt owing to another, the assumption of the debt makes the creditor a third-party
beneficiary as a matter of law. See Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc., v.
Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).7 In Ron Case Roofing, a sub-contractor sued the
shareholders of the general contractor corporation based upon the terms of a settlement
agreement between the corporation and its shareholders, which provided, in part, as
follows:
The Vesper group "agree to pay all indebtedness which is presently
outstanding or in the future may arise which claims relate to the furnishing
of labor, materials, equipment, tools, fuel, supplies and other items
furnished to or incorporated into the Vesper Project.
7

The Ron Case Roofing decision is based on Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, which Utah courts have long followed to determine whether a non-party is
entitled to the rights of a third-party beneficiary under a contract. See, id.; Clark v.
American Standard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1978). Section 302(l)(a) provides:
A beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a
right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties and .. .the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary. ...
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302(l)(a) (emphasis added).
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/</.,773P.2datl386.
The shareholders in Ron Case Roofing raised the same arguments that Tremco
asks this Court to accept. In response thereto, this Court held in Ron Case Roofing that
"one who assumes a debtor's obligations creates enforceable third-party beneficiary
rights in the debtor's creditors." Id. at 1387 (citations omitted). This Court rejected the
argument that the sub-contractor was not identified as a third-party beneficiary. In
analyzing the agreement this Court stated:
Giving these words their "usual and ordinary meaning," Commercial Bldg.
Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977), it is plain that the parties
intended that the Vesper group would pay all obligations of Brooks due
those furnishing labor and materials on any Vesper project, a description
that includes Ron Case. Judged by the standards summarized in section
302 of the Restatement and followed by our cases, Ron Case is, therefore, a
third-party beneficiary under the settlement agreement, as the trial court
held. See Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 703 P.2d at 300; Tracy Collins
Bank & Trust, 652 P.2d at 1315.
Ron Case Roofing, 113 P.2d at 1386. In Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652
P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982), the Court indicated that when the performance of the promise
satisfies or recognizes an actual or supposed duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, then
the third-party may recover as a third-party creditor beneficiary. Id. at 1315; see also
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 131 (Utah 1991); Treasure Valley Foods, Inc. v. J-M
Poultry Packing Co., 564 P.2d 978, 980 (Idaho 1977); Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 P.2d 1261,
1263 (N.M. 1973); Argys v. McGlothlen, 276 P.2d 983, 985 (Colo. 1954) (en banc).
As a creditor that was specifically named in the Tremco Agreement, BYU
obtained third-party beneficiary status when Tremco agreed to be solely responsible for
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the BYU claims as follows: "Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the
responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the defense
and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter."(R2000. 56) (emphasis added). The
Tremco Agreement even clarified that BYU's claims related to the "royalties claimed
owing under license arrangements regarding the Dsearch algorhythm" and further
provides that:
In conjunction therewith, Tremco shall assume all costs and expenses of
every nature, including legal costs and expenses with respect to the current
disputes with BYU and shall indemnify and hold SoftSolutions harmless
from any and all claims, damages or liabilities or any nature, including but
not limited to costs and attorneys fees, stemming from or in connection
with, BYU's claims with respect to the DSearch algorhythm.
(R2000. 55-56.) The Tremco Agreement is dispositive that Tremco assumed the
obligations owing to BYU under the license agreement. As such, the District Court's
entry of summary judgment against Tremco for the indebtedness owing to BYU was
appropriate.
II.

BECAUSE TREMCO HAD ASSUMED THE INDEBTEDNESS OWING TO
BYU AND CONTROLLED AND PAID FOR ALL OF THE LITIGATION
CONCERNING THAT INDEBTEDNESS, THE FINAL ORDER MADE IN
THAT LITIGATION IS BINDING UPON TREMCO.
The District Court correctly held that the SoftSolutions Judgment, and the findings

and conclusions supporting the SoftSolutions Judgment, are binding upon SoftSolutions
and its "privies" pursuant to the doctrines ofres judicata and/or collateral estoppel. (R.

The doctrine of res judicata "has two branches: cclaim preclusion' refers to the branch
which has often been referred to as 'res judicata' or 'merger and bar' [and] 'issue
preclusion' [which] refers to the branch often termed 'collateral estoppel.'" Boudreaux,
1999 UT App 310, f20 (citing In re Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39,1[15).
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1047.) See In re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39, 982
P.2d 69. Res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent parties or their privies from
relitigating claims or issues which were litigated on the merits and brought to a final
judgment. Bourdreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310, ^[20, 989 P.2d 1103.
The following elements are necessary for the doctrine ofres judicata or collateral
estoppel to apply: (1) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have been a
party, assignee, or privy to the prior adjudication; (2) the claims or issues decided in the
prior action must be identical to those presented in the instant action, or in the case of res
judicata, the claims or issues may be those which could have been raised but were not;
(3) the claims and issues in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly
litigated therein; and (4) the action must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
See In re Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39,1fi[l6-l8; accord Fitzgerald v. Corbett,
793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990); Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971). As set forth below, each of the foregoing elements is satisfied.
A.

Tremco and Its Shareholders are Privies of SoftSolutions Because They
Controlled and Paid For the SoftSolutions Litigation.

"A person who is not a party to an action but who controls or substantially
participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the
determination of issues as through he were a party." Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 39. The United States Supreme Court explained that:
To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and
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vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent decisions.
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties assume control
over litigation in which they have a direct financial or proprietary interest
and then seek to redetermine issues previously resolved. As this Court
observed in Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 111 U.S. 475, 486-487,
30 S.Ct. 608, 612, 54 L.Ed. 846 (1910), the persons for whose benefit and
at whose direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be
"strangers to the cause .... [0]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in the
name of another to establish and protect his own right, or who assists in the
prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of his own ... is
as much bound ... as he would be if he had been a party to the record." See
Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262, n. 4, 81 S.Ct. 557,
559, 5 L.Ed.2d 540 (1961); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 111, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1570, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969).
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154(1979).
As set forth above, Tremco agreed in writing to assume the indebtedness owing to
BYU. (R. 521-22). As a result of the foregoing assumption, Tremco litigated and
undertook the defense in the litigation with BYU. Indeed, Tremco stipulated that K.
Duncan, L. Duncan and Tedjamulia, who were officers of both SoftSolutions and
Tremco, "continued to direct the conduct of BYU's pending arbitration against
[SoftSolutions]" and that Tremco paid for the legal services provided in the arbitration.
(R. 1031-32.). Tremco acknowledges the foregoing in the Tremco Agreement:
A. Prior to the date hereof, certain disputes have arisen with
respect to claims by Brigham Young University ("BYU") as to
royalties claimed owing under license arrangements regarding the
Dsearch algorhythm.
B.
Tremco has been involved in defending that action and has,
itself, asserted various claims against BYU as offsets or absolute
defenses.
* * * *
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1.
Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the responsible
party with respect to the B YU claims and is solely responsible for the
defense and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter.
(R. 521-22) (emphasis added). The Tremco Agreement was signed by Duncan as
the president and Chief Executive Officer of SoftSolutions Technology and by A.
Tedjamulia, Vice President of Tremco. (R. 521.)
Because Tremco agreed in writing to be responsible for the claims owing to
BYU and because Tremco stipulated in writing that it directed and paid for the
litigation with BYU, Tremco is a "privy" to that litigation and is bound by the
findings, conclusions and judgment made in those proceedings as a matter of law.
B.

The Claims and Issues Alleged by Tremco Are Identical to the Claims and
Issues Raised or Which Could Have Been Raised in the Primary Litigation.

Res judicata's "obvious purpose is to discourage successive applications based on
the same grounds." Boudeazix, 1999 UT App 310,1[ 20 (citations omitted). It is clear
that Tremco "s alleged claims were presented or were available to be presented in the
earlier litigation. (R2000. 41-52.) Indeed, any claims Tremco may have had certainly
would have arisen prior to the arbitration in September 1996 because Tremco's alleged
claims and defenses related to the 1987, 1988 and 1990 license agreements with BYU.
Importantly, Tremco admits that it had "asserted various claims against BYU as
offsets or absolute defenses." (R2000. 55-56.) Tremco's admission that it was involved
in and asserted defenses in the arbitration is supported by the record which reflects this
Court's ruling that royalties accrued on the sale of CLASS Conflicts of Interest product,
"a product developed and sold by ... Tremco Consultants, Inc." (R2000. 13.) Based
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upon the foregoing, the District Court was correct that Tremco's claims and defenses
were or could have been presented in the arbitration proceeding, the subsequent litigation
before the District Court, and in the prior appeal affirmed by this Court. (R. 1046.)
C.

The Claims and Issues Asserted in the Primary Action were Completely,
Fully and Fairly Litigated.

The memorandum decision by the arbitrator addressed the same claims and
defenses which Tremco alleged in the subsequent proceedings, including but not limited
to the fact that: (1) the D-Search technology and system failed; (2) that BYU failed to
provide the necessary support; (3) that BYU failed to protect the D-Search patent; and (4)
that BYU impermissibly allowed other to use D-Search. (R2000. 41-52). As a result, the
written decision by the arbitrator and the SoftSolutions Judgment made by the District
Court are conclusive evidence that the same claims and defenses alleged by Tremco were
fully, fairly and completely litigated between the parties in the primary action.
D.

The Prior Litigation with BYU Resulted in a Judgment on the Merits that
was Affirmed by this Court.

As heretofore stated, on July 7, 1998, the SoftSolutions Judgment was entered by
the District Court. This Court affirmed that final judgment on May 19, 2000, but for a
minor modification in attorneys' fees. See SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ.,
2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095. As such, the District Court was correct in determining that a
final judgment on the merits had been entered.
In sum, because all of the elements needed for the application of res judicata and
collateral estoppel were fully satisfied in the prior litigation between the parties, the
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District Court did not error or abuse its discretion in applying those doctrines to its
decision which granted BYU's motion for summary judgment.
III.

THE EXISTENCE OF SEPARATE ENTITIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE
APPLICATION OF THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE TO PRIVIES.
Tremco cites several cases and argues extensively that BYU's claim must fail

because BYU did not prove an "alter ego" relationship. While an alter ego relationship
likely existed between Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc., the alter ego issue is not
dispositive of the application of the "privy" doctrine for purposes ofres judicata. The
doctrines are separate from one another. Tremco is liable as a "privy" under the final
judgment made by the District Court because Tremco and its officers and directors
controlled and paid for the litigation, had a financial stake in the outcome, and as a result
Tremco's interests were fully represented in the litigation. Again, Tremco acknowledged
this in the Tremco Agreement by declaring that Tremco was already asserting its claims,
offsets and absolute defenses against BYU's D-Scarch claims. (R. 521-22.)
The decision in Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978) fully supports
BYU's position. In that case, this Court clarified that the "privy" doctrine applies to final
judgments if "one's interest has been legally represented at the time." Id. at 691. The
same doctrine was applied by this Court in Tanner v. Bacon, State Engineer, et ai, 136
P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 1943). More recently, this Court explained that the "privy" doctrine
also applies to claims or interests which "could have been" presented in the earlier action.
See In re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d at 70. As such,
it is simply inaccurate for Tremco to argue that the doctrines of res judicata and/or
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collateral estoppel apply to privies only if those privies are determined to be alter egos of
one another. Such has never been the law.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
STANDARDS BY MAKING A JUDGMENT AGAINST TREMCO.
Appellants try to position their appeal as being based on a violation of due

process. However, as discussed above, the appeal is about Tremco's written assumption
of the claims owing to BYU, its assumption and full control of the litigation with BYU
and the binding effects of the SoftSolutions Judgment entered by the District Court as a
result of those proceedings.
The primary case relied upon by Appellants is Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazletine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct. 1562 (1969). However, the opinion provides that
proceedings like those brought against Tremco are indeed proper.
Likewise, were it shown that Hazeltine through its officer, Dodds, in fact
controlled the litigation on behalf of HRL and if the claim were made that
the judgment against HRI would be res judicata against Hazeltine because
of this control, that claim itself could be finally adjudicated against
Hazeltine only in a court with jurisdiction over that company. See G&C
Merrian Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, S.Ct. 477, 60 L.Ed. 868 (1916);
Schnell v. Peter Exkerich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 81 S. Ct 557, 5 L.Ed.
546(1961).
Id. at 111-12. This is precisely what BYU has done. BYU obtained a Judgment against
SoftSolutions in litigation that Tremco paid for, controlled and participated in. Also,
Tremco had a financial stake in the outcome because its claims and defenses were raised
therein and because it had agreed to be responsible for the payment of BYU's D-Search
claims. Accordingly, once BYU obtained the SoftSolutions Judgment and Tremco
reflised to pay the Judgment, BYU sued Tremco and asserted therein the doctrines of res
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judicata and collateral estoppel for the reasons discussed. BYU's actions were in
complete harmony with the Zenith decision.
Moreover, although the Supplemental Order is not on appeal, Appellants argue
that the Supplemental Order violates their process rights. However, the Supplemental
Order was entered in response to BYU's motion for summary judgment and declaratory
relief and after a full and complete hearing was conducted by the District Court. Indeed,
Tremco appeared with its counsel and presented an extensive argument at the hearing.
After the hearing, the Court determined that the $15 million in sale proceeds which had
been transferred to the owners of SoftSolutions (i.e., KWD, AST and Julee), could be
used to satisfy the SoftSolutions Judgment. The Court further determined that if a
dispute arose concerning the traceability of those proceeds, a person could request a
hearing from the District Court at the time of the garnishment or execution proceeding
and the Court would then conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
proceeds had been adequately traced by BYU. Indeed, such a process is a common
procedure under UTAH R. CIV. P. 64 and 69 when a judgment debtor transfers property to
avoid collection. Since the entry of the Supplemental Order, the District Court has
indeed conducted an evidentiary hearing with respect to the tracing of such proceeds, a
full hearing was given by the District Court to the entity which received a portion of the
sale proceeds. In sum, contrary to Appellants' accusations of the District Court depriving
them of their due process rights, the District Court has been very careful to protect the
due process rights of all parties involved.
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V.

THIS COURT LACKS APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO HEAR ANY
APPEAL OF THE JULY 10, 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER.
The Supplemental Order, which was made exclusively to aid in the collection of

the July 8, 1998 SoftSolutions Judgment9 is not a final order for purposes of appeal
because Appellants filed several Post-Judgment Motions pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 52,
59 and 60 (R.l 117-19, 1155-57, 1478-81), and no notice of appeal has been filed by
Appellants since the adjudication of those Post-Judgment Motions. Accordingly, but
respectfully, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Supplemental Order at
this time. Although UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a) requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days
after the entry of the final order, UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) indicates that the order is not final
for purposes of appeal until any timely filed post-judgment motions have been
adjudicated and a final order entered thereon. UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b).
Indeed, counsel for Duncan, et al. acknowledged to the District Court that "this
July 10th order is not yet a final order, it is not yet appealable because of the post
judgment motions which preclude its being determined a final order until such time as
these motions are either granted or denied." (R. Supp. 81-82.) Because no notice of
appeal of the Supplemental Order has been filed since the District Court denied the Post9

Appellants' argument that the Supplemental Order was made to enforce the Tremco
Judgment is not supported by the record. The opening paragraph of the Supplemental
Order states unequivocally, that "BYU sought a supplemental order to assist it in the
collection of the money judgment made and entered in favor of BYU by this Court, as
modified by the Utah Supreme Court." (R. 1150) The very next paragraph defines the
word "Judgment" in the Supplemental Order to be "the money judgment heretofore made
by this Court, as modified by the Utah Supreme Court in its decision in the matter of
SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000)." (Id.) The
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Judgment Motions, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Supplemental
Order at this time.
A.

A Notice of Appeal Filed Before the District Court's Adjudication of the
Post-Judgment Motions Fails to Confer Jurisdiction on This Court.

This Court has recognized that "[a] notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon this Court."
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (citations
omitted); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of
the above motions shall have no effect."). Indeed,
[a] timely motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial filed
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59 suspends the finality of
the challenged order or judgment rendering "a notice of appeal filed prior to
disposition of such a motion by entry of a signed order [ineffective] to
confer jurisdiction on an appellate court.
Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT App. 154, Tf 4, 978 P.2d 1051 (quoting Anderson v.
Schwediman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah App. 1988)).
In Anderson, the appellant filed his notice of appeal after the district court issued
its ruling denying the appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment, but before the
district court made its written order with respect to the motion. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction holding that even though the
district court had made its ruling, "a notice of appeal filed prior to entry of such order is
premature and does not confer jurisdiction on this Court." Anderson, 764 P.2d at 1000.
Similar to Anderson, the Appellants in this case filed their notices of appeal before the

Court then ordered that "BYU's motion, which seeks supplemental relief in connection
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entry of any order reflecting the District Court's denial of their Post-Judgment Motions.
Thus, as in Anderson, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Supplemental Order.
B.

The Appellants' Post-Judgment Motions are Not Rule 60(b) Motions.

Tremco argued before the District Court that the Supplemental Order was a final
order and that Tremco's post-judgment motion was "properly cast under Rule 60(b)" and
not under Rules 52 or 59. Although Tremco's post-judgment motion does not cite the
rule upon which it is based, it is the law of this state that "[r]egardless of its caption, 'a
motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the
court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion under
either Rules 52(b) or 59(e).'" Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres, 2000 UT App.
338,14, 15 P.3d 112 (citing Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1996)
(construing a paper entitled Motion to Reconsider to be a motion under rules 52 and 59)).
Even if Tremco's Post-Judgment Motion was construed exclusively under Rule
60(b), the Post-Judgment Motions filed by SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al. clearly
precluded the Supplemental Order from becoming final. See UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b)
(motion filed "by any party" requires new notice of appeal to be filed). Indeed as
previously mentioned, Duncan, et al. argued to the District Court below that the
Supplemental Order was a non-final order because of the several Post-Judgment Motions.
(R. Supp. 81-82.) Accordingly, because the Supplemental Order is not a final order for
purposes of appeal, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Supplemental
Order at this time.
with the enforcement of this Court's Judgment, is hereby granted." (R. 1143)
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VI.

BYU IS ENTITLED TO ENFORCE ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
APPROXIMATELY $15 MILLION DOLLARS IN PROCEEDS RECEIVED
BY THE OWNERS OF SOFTSOLUTIONS
BYU is entitled to execute upon the nearly $15 million dollars in proceeds

received by the owners of SoftSolutions to pay for the SoftSolutions Judgment under one
or more of the following alternative theories.
A.

KWD, AST and Julee are Jointly Liable for Debts Incurred after
SoftSolutions' Dissolution.

Utah law is settled that officers, directors and/or shareholders of a dissolved
corporation who cause the dissolved corporation to act like a corporation but knowing
that the corporation has been dissolved, become personally liable for the debts incurred
by the dissolved entity.
In 1992, the Utah legislature adopted the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-l et seq. which expressly repealed the de facto corporate
doctrine which allowed dissolved corporations to act as de facto corporations despite the
dissolution of the corporate veil. With the repeal of the de facto doctrine, the new Act
provides that "all persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing
there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all
liabilities created while so acting." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-204 (emphasis added).
The foregoing statute applies to actions taken by officers, directors or shareholders of the
corporation after its dissolution. In Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), this
Court explained:
As to corporations that have been suspended and not reinstated, we hold
that officers and directors who continue the business of a suspended
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corporation are personally liable for all debts and liabilities arising from
those operations that are a continuation of the types of activities the
corporation performed. Under such circumstances, the relationship of
persons who continue the operations of a suspended corporation is like the
relationship of pre-incorporation promoters, which is-essentially that of
partners. Thus, persons who act as if pursuant to valid corporate authority,
after that authority has been suspended, are personally responsible for
liabilities arising from the continued operations. {First Nat 7 Bank of
Boston v. Silberstein, 398 S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Tex. 1966)). They are
jointly and severally liable with those who know the corporation's authority
is no longer effective but continue its operations.
Id, at 878 (citations omitted), see also, Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 495 (Utah
1996). In the present case, a final judgment was made and entered in favor of BYU
against SoftSolutions and affirmed by this Court. The litigation was commenced long
after SoftSolutions was dissolved in 1992. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that
SoftSolutions business was carried on after its dissolution and that damages were
awarded through March 1996.
In addition, Duncan testified that the licenses transferred to WordPerfect as part of
the SoftSolutions Technology stock sale were owned by SoftSolutions and that
SoftSolutions Technology obtained those licenses from SoftSolutions without paying any
consideration. (R. Supp. 60-62.) Tremco admitted this fact before the District Court
early in the litigation. (R. 719) ("Before [SoftSolutions5] dissolution these licenses,
including the DSearch license from BYU, were assigned to [SoftSolutions Technology],
and [SoftSolutions] had no other assets."). Additionally, Duncan testified repeatedly that
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SoftSolutions Technology was "incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
SoftSolutions, Inc."10 (R. Supp. 63, 68-69.)
In sum, because the owners of SoftSolutions knowingly continued in business long
after the corporation had been dissolved and incurred debts and liabilities owing to BYU
under its licensing agreement up through 1996, the owners of SoftSolutions are jointly
liable for the debts and judgment owing to BYU.
B.

UTAH R. Civ. P. 17(d) Provides that an Unincorporated Entity May be Sued
by its Common Name and that a Judgment Made in Such Common Name
Binds all of the Property Owned by the Association.

UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(d) expressly provides that when an association, which is not a
corporation, transacts business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of
the members of the association or not, the association may be sued by such common
name, and the judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of
all of the associates in the same manner as though all of the members of the association
had been individually sued. UTAH R. ClV. P. 17(d).
In compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, SoftSolutions was sued by
its common name in the action brought in the District Court in 1996, (years after the
corporation had been dissolved by the State of Utah) (R. 2000 31, 56; R. 1030-32.) The
District Court made a money judgment against the dissolved entity (i.e., the SoftSolution
Judgment), which was affirmed by this Court on appeal. However, the owners of the
dissolved entity refused to pay any part of the SoftSolutions Judgment despite this
10

Ken Duncan recanted this testimony three weeks later (and after consultation with
counsel), but was unable to give any specific independent reason for his "new"
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Court's affirmance thereof. As such, the SoftSolutions Judgment is enforceable against
all joint assets of the Association including the approximately $15 million in stock sale
proceeds the Association received from the sale of its assets to WordPerfect.
Consequently, the District Court properly concluded and ordered that BYU may enforce
the SoftSolutions Judgment against the assets of the unincorporated Association
including but not limited to the nearly $ 15 million obtained from the sale of SoftSolutions
Technology stock to WordPerfect. (R. 1044.)
Contrary to Appellants' accusations, at no time has BYU ever attempted to
execute on the personal assets of K. Duncan, L. Duncan or A. Tedjamulia.
C.

The Owners, Officers and Directors of the SoftSolutions Association, were
Partners Because They jointly Engaged in an Unincorporated Business to
Make a Profit.

A partnership is defined as an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a business for profit. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-3. Similarly, a joint venture
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business
enterprise. Id. § 48-1-3.1. Such an association, "does not always arise pursuant to formal
agreement; rather it is a relationship voluntarily entered by the parties and may be proven
by the actions taken by the parties." Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1032
(Utah 1987) (referring to a joint venture). A joint venture/partnership exists when two or
more parties form "a community of interest in the performance of the common purpose, a
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in

recollection. (See, R. Supp. 76-78.)
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the profits, and ... a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained." Bassett v. Baker,
530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). Each of these elements exists in the Association.
Under Utah law, "all partners are liable ... jointly for all other debts and
obligations of the partnership, except a partner may enter into a separate obligation to
perform a partnership contract." UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-l-12(b). After SoftSolutions'
was dissolved in 1992, the prior shareholders of SoftSolutions together with Tremco and
SoftSolutions Technology, which entities the owners also completely owned, managed
and controlled, "formed a community of common interest in the performance of the
common purpose." Bassett, 530 P.2d. The Association's purpose was to continue
operating SoftSolutions' business for profit under Ihe name of SoftSolutions. Indeed, the
record clearly shows that after SoftSolutions was dissolved, SoftSolutions continued
operating under the license that BYU issued to SoftSolutions pursuant to the 1990
Agreement. (R2000. 22, 338-334; R. 507, 1045, 1148-1149.)
Long after SoftSolutions was dissolved, SoftSolutions Technology, another
partner in the Association, continued to receive and conceal royalties owed to BYU. In
1994, SoftSolutions Technology transferred SoftSolutions license to WordPerfect in
exchange for approximately $15 million (R. 1218-65). All of the business conducted by
Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology under the SoftSolutions license was part of the
common purpose of the Association. The furtherance of the Association's common
purpose was also facilitated by the fact that both Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology
had joint control or a right to exercise some degree of control over the business activities
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of the other because they had identical shareholders, directors and officers (R2000. 22)
and because they shared employees (R2000. 55).
Furthermore, the Association's members had, and knew that they had, a "duty to
share any loses that may be sustained" by the Association. This is evidenced by the fact
that the two partners, SoftSolutions Technology and Tremco, entered into an indemnity
agreement to "clarify the respective responsibilities of the companies with respect to the
BYU claims." (R2000. 56.) The agreement was made so the assets of the partnership
could be placed into SoftSolutions Technology and sold to WordPerfect for more than
$15 million. Because of the foregoing event, and because the Association refused to pay
the SoftSolutions Judgment once affirmed on appeal, the District Court properly
determined and ordered that BYU could enforce the SoftSolutions Judgment against the
$ 15 million in sale proceeds received by the Association from WordPrefect.
D.

BYU is Entitled to Execute on the Association's Joint Assets Received
from the Sale of SoftSolutions Technology Stock to WordPerfect.

"If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if
the court orders, may levy execution on the assets transferred or its proceeds." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 25-6-8. Tremco admits that at the time SoftSolutions purportedly to assign
its rights under the license agreements with BYU to SoftSolutions Technology that there
were no other assets belonging to SoftSolutions. (R. 1043; R.Supp.65-67.) As such, it is
undisputed that SoftSolutions, if treated as a separate entity, was insolvent at the time the
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foregoing transfer was made because the sum of SoftSolutions' debts were greater than
its assets (none) at a fair valuation pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-1.11
In addition, because SoftSolutions, if treated as a separate entity, had no assets
after the transfer of the license, SoftSolutions did not receive anything in exchange for
the transfer. As such, the transfer made by SoftSolutions to SoftSolutions Technology
was fraudulent as to BYU. Thereafter, SoftSolutions Technology's assets, i.e., the
license rights obtained from BYU, were transferred to WordPerfect for approximately
$15 million. Accordingly, the District Court's July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order was
indeed lawful and appropriate.
E.

Proceeds of the SoftSolutions Technology Sale Were Improperly
Distributed to the Prior Shareholders of SoftSolutions Before the Claims of
Creditors were Paid.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-I0a-1408 provides that if a corporation causes its assets to
be distributed to its shareholders before the claims of creditors are paid, the shareholders
are liable to the extent of the value of such distribution. The law is based in part on the
equitable doctrine that such distributions are assets of the corporation held in constructive
trust by the shareholders for the benefit of creditors and are subject to execution. Thus,
the District Court properly determined that BYU was entitled to an order allowing it to
recover from the assets which had been distributed to the shareholders of the dissolved
SoftSolutions entity before the debts and obligations of the corporation were paid.
F.

The Supplemental Order is Factually Sound.

11

SoftSolutions was also presumed insolvent, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-3,
because it was not paying it debts as they became due.
47

The facts supporting the District Court's Supplemental Order are not disputed. In
1990, BYU and SoftSolutions entered into the 1990 License Agreement, which gave
SoftSolutions the exclusive rights to use D-Search (R. 1218-65.) Although the 1990
Agreement contained a clause restricting assignment, SoftSolutions assigned its license to
SoftSolutions Technology without BYU's knowledge or approval (R2000. 18-19.)
SoftSolutions Technology, as an affiliate of SoftSolutions thereby became liable along
with SoftSolutions for the royalties generated from the sale of SoftSolutions
Technology's products. (R2000. 18-19,22.)
After SoftSolutions was dissolved in 1992, SoftSolutions Technology continued to
act in the name of SoftSolutions for many years, sold products using D-Search and
generated millions of dollars in royalties that were owed to BYU under the 1990 license
agreement. (R2000. 22-23.) In spite of the Association's success using BYU's property,
it did not remit the royalties to BYU (R2000. 22-23, 44.)
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
STRUCK THE IMPROPER AFFIDAVIT FILED BY KENNETH DUNCAN.
In a civil case, the district court's "decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a

broad grant of discretion." In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to
the Use of all the Water, 1999 UT 39, ^f 25 (citations omitted). In this case the District
Court struck Kenneth Duncan's affidavit because it violated the parol evidence rule,
contradicted the prior record before the District Court and the arbitrator, was not based on
personal knowledge, and contained statements which were otherwise inadmissible under
the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 1035- 38.)
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A.

The Duncan Affidavit Violated the Parol Evidence Rule.

When a written agreement is unambiguous and clear on its face, extraneous or
parol evidence should not be admitted. See Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983); see also E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522
P.2d 144 (Utah 1974). In Broderick, this Court emphasized that
Parol evidence may not be given to change the terms of a written agreement
which are clear, definite, and unambiguous. To permit that would be to
cast doubt upon the integrity of all contracts and to leave a party to a
solemn agreement at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given
by one who in the subsequent light of events discovers that he made a bad
bargain.
Broderick, 522 P.2d at 145-46. The District Court's determination that portions of the
affidavit "attempt to alter tenns of the contract which is violative of the parol evidence
rule" (R. 1037) is within the District Court's broad discietion and should be upheld.
B.

The Duncan Affidavit Contradicted the Record before the District Court.

A trial court can strike statements that are contradicted by the law of the case and
the record before the district court. See Cohen v. Goodfriend, 665 F. Supp. 152, 160
(E.D.N.Y. 1987). As correctly determined by the District Court, the Duncan Affidavit
was unsupported by the record, specifically regarding the fact that Tremco had "been
involved in defending [the SoftSolutions] action and has, itself, asserted various claim
against the Plaintiff as offsets or absolute defenses." (R. 1037, R2000. 147).
C.

The Duncan Affidavit Was Not Based on Personal Knowledge.

An affidavit "must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth
facts that would be admissible in evidence to show that the affiant is competent to testify
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to the matters stated therein." Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d
538, 542 (Utah 1973); accord Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d
1019, 1020-21 (Utah 1972) (affidavit must be based on personal knowledge); GNS
Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah App. 1994) (same). The District
Court's determination that the Duncan Affidavit is without foundation to testify regarding
the intentions and motivation of other officers and directors of other entities is supported
by the record and well within the discretion of the District Court.
D.

The Duncan Affidavit Attempted to Make Impermissible Conclusions.

The law is well-settled that a lay witness may not testify concerning the law or
make legal conclusions. Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.
1976); Stoler v. Perm Central Transp. Co., 583 F2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978). In addition,
statements in affidavits that are "conclusory in form" are improper and "may not be
considered on summary judgment under Rule 56(e)." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,
859 (Utah 1983). The Court undertook a "careful review" of these statements and found
them to be "inadmissible conclusions ... prohibited as support for a motion." (R. 1038.)
Such a determination by the District Court is within its discretion and should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing this Court should uphold the Fourth District Court's
June 13, 2002, judgment against Tremco Consultants, Inc. Furthermore, the Court should
dismiss any appeal of the July 10, 2002, Supplemental Order for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. However, if this Court determines it may review the Supplemental Order,
the Court should affirm the entry of the Supplemental Order.
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